In Germany, too, there are commentators who support the use of anti-suit injunctions for reasons of effi cacy and sustaining competition between law systems. 18 Generally, however, there does not seem to be a positive attitude and courts have actually denied the service of an anti-suit injunction. 19 In particular, the prevailing opinion is that arbitration agreements cannot establish an obligation not to sue abroad.
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Relevant Decisions by the ECJ and Reactions from the English Courts
The possibility for English courts to use anti-suit injunctions to protect private agreements had already suffered substantial blows before West Tankers. 21 The judgment in Turner concerned the use of anti-suit injunctions within the scope of the Regulation. It followed the reasoning that had been used in Gasser to establish that in cases of parallel proceedings only the court fi rst seised may decide on the jurisdiction: the need to promote legal certainty and mutual trust in the different legal systems and judicial institutions, on which the Regulation is necessarily based. The Regulation's rules are common to every court and are interpreted and applied with the same authority by every court, which includes examining its own jurisdiction. Similarly, it was held in Turner that the Regulation prohibited the grant of anti-suit injunctions in support of jurisdiction agreements even where defendants acted with the purpose of frustrating the proceedings. An anti-suit injunction that restrains from commencing proceedings elsewhere constitutes an interference with another jurisdiction, even though it is targeted to a party. Again, the argument was mutual trust, as it is principally this trust that enables the existence of a compulsory system of rules, which needs to be applied with the same authority by every national court. The principle of non-revision of jurisdiction was confi rmed. Further, the ECJ declared that even if the anti-suit injunction was a procedural means to protect national proceedings, and therefore a matter of national law ever, hope was still left regarding arbitration agreements. 22 The scope of the exception in Article 1(2)(d) JR had not been clearly settled. What the ECJ had decided was that: (i) solely the subject-matter of the proceedings is decisive for the question as to whether proceedings fall under the exception, regardless of preliminary issues; 23 (ii) the nature of the rights protected by an interim measure determine if the measure is covered by the arbitration exception; 24 (iii) the arbitration exception intends to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts of a nature ancillary to arbitration. 25 The use of anti-suit injunctions to protect arbitration agreements, even under the "worsened conditions", is best represented by two cases, The Ivan Zagubanski and Through Transport.
In The Ivan Zagubanski, Aikens J took a broad view of the arbitration exception. 26 He deduced that the Regulation does not apply where the principal focus of the matter is arbitration, including the issue of who examines the existence of an arbitration agreement. 27 The objective of granting an anti-suit injunction, he explained, is to make the defendants adhere to their agreement, to refer the dispute to arbitration, and thereby enforce it. Thus he held that the focus was arbitration and the exception applied. 28 In Through Transport, the court decided that it was entitled to determine whether proceedings that were brought to protect a London arbitration clause fell within the scope of the Regulation, even though it was the court second seised. 29 The principles in Gasser were held not to apply. Whereas in Gasser the alone, national laws may not impair the effectiveness of the Regulation. Such a practice was held to render the Regulation's mechanisms for lis pendens ineffective and give rise to situations for which the Regulation contained no solutions. Ibid, paras 13, 18, 20. 26 See Navigation Maritime Bulgare, supra n 14, paras 71, 72, 80, 100. In this case proceedings were brought in Marseilles in breach of a London arbitration clause. In his interpretation at paras 70-72 Aikens J drew on Advocate General Darmon's view in Rich. However, he recognised at para 74 that the decision of the ECJ "may have been narrowly confi ned to the question of whether an appointment of an arbitrator was excluded". 27 Ibid, paras 65, 72, 100.
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Aikens J dismissed the concerns in Phillip Alexander, supra n 17, and Toepfer, supra n 9, because they contained no new principles: see ibid, paras 110, 112. 29 See Through Transport, supra n 12. In this case, a shipper and its insurer New India (NI) had settled a claim after goods had been lost under a shipping contract, whereby NI had become entitled to exercise the shipper's rights against the carrier. The latter then became insolvent, so parties had accepted that both proceedings fell within the Regulation, Through Transport was not concerned with the question of how the regime applied, but whether it applied at all. 30 The case was also held to be different from Turner as the target proceedings were not vexatious, but in breach of an agreement. 31 The court granted the injunction. 32 In both cases granting an anti-suit injunction was held to be outside of the scope of the Regulation, as the latter contains no rules intending to unify arbitration. 33 This "scope-based-interpretation" of the Regulation, which allows a broad application of national law to be compatible with the Regulation's aims, is not uncommon in English case-law. 34 Before West Tankers, the principle of mutual trust, which had been used in Turner to hold that the use of anti-suit injunctions within the regime of the Regulation impaired its effectiveness, 35 was considered only in case the Regulation applied at all. 36 The Regulation, however, did not apply to the injunctive proceedings.
C. WEST TANKERS: A QUESTION OF FOCUS
As the facts of the case are well known and the decision has been discussed excellently in many articles, 37 this article will just very briefl y recall the main arguments that are relevant for the following discussion.
that NI issued proceedings in Finland against the carrier's insurer, Through Transport, under a Finnish third parties' rights statute. The dispute arose whether instead the parties were bound by a clause providing for arbitration in London, with the action based on the insurance contract between E and the carrier rather than the statutory right. E issued proceedings in England and applied for an injunction, which was granted. NI then appealed. 30 Ibid, paras 82, 83, 84, 89. 31 Ibid, paras 82, 90, 91. 32 He followed The Angelic Grace and The Ivan Zagubanski. But see Sir Anthony Clarke, "The Differing Approach to Commercial Litigation in the European Court of Justice and the Courts of England and Wales" [2007] European Business Law Review 101, at 128, where he says: "I recognise that there is scope for argument as to whether that is correct or not." 33 See West Tankers (HL), supra n 6, paras 12, 14. 34 See In Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1991] 3 WLR 397; West Tankers (HL), supra n 6, paras 12, 14. See also E Peel, "Forum Non Conveniens and European Ideals" [2005] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 363; Clark, supra n 32, 110. 35 See Turner, supra n 21, paras 24 and 25. 
The Decision
Following the Advocate General's opinion that "the decisive question is not whether the application for an anti-suit injunction . . . falls within the scope of application of the Regulation, but whether the proceedings against which the anti-suit injunction is directed . . . do so", 38 the ECJ held that although the English proceedings before the House of Lords (the injunctive proceedings) could not come within the scope of the Regulation, they nevertheless had consequences which undermine its effectiveness. 39 The ECJ then reconfi rmed the principles established in Gasser and Turner. 40 Then, in a strict application of the subject-matter test, the ECJ held that the foreign proceedings, against which the anti-suit injunction was directed, were within the Regulation, as compared to the subject-matter the existence of an arbitration agreement is only a preliminary issue of an incidental nature. 41 Thus, any objection of lack of jurisdiction based on such an agreement had to be within the scope of the Regulation too. Otherwise an applicant who considers the agreement void would be barred from access to a national court and thus denied judicial protection. 42 Therefore, it was exclusively for the court which initially had that jurisdiction to rule on that objection. 43 The ECJ found support in Article II (3) New York Convention, which empowers a national court to assess if an agreement is void or otherwise incapable of being performed before it is obliged to refer the dispute to arbitration.
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Sense and Sensibility
West Tankers contains a sensible and comprehensive legal argumentation and demonstrates par excellance the diffi culties created by the clash of two different legal traditions when interpreting the term "arbitration" in Article 1(2)(d) JR.
The ECJ used a "double even-if-argumentation" to resolve the clash. Its fi rst part concerns deciding in relation to which proceedings the scope of the Regulation needs to be determined. It shifts the focus away from the injunctive proceedings in England to the allegedly abusive proceedings affected by the anti-suit injunction. 45 This allowed the ECJ to discharge a great part of Lord West Tankers (ECJ), supra n 1, para 31.
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Ibid, para 27. Thus, the ruling seems to go further than the Advocate General's opinion at para 61, who says that the examination of the agreement is not reserved to the arbitral body.
44
Ibid, para 33.
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From hereafter in this article the proceedings for granting an anti-suit injunction will be referred to as injunctive proceedings, the proceedings brought in the national court as the abusive proceedings and the proceedings before the tribunal as the intended proceedings.
Hoffmann's well-founded and signifi cant arguments, 46 as they concerned only the injunctive proceedings.
The second part concerns how the fact that an arbitration agreement is alleged might affect the classifi cation of the abusive proceedings and the question of who (else) is entitled to examine the existence of the agreement. In both parts, fundamentally different legal traditions clash with each other. The Anglo-American, which takes a private law perspective and the Continental-European, which takes a public law perspective.
(a) The First "Even-if ": Shifting the Focus Away from the Injunctive Proceedings
The latter view is represented by the ECJ's rightful consideration that in the case of a valid anti-suit injunction, the applicant would be barred from judicial protection. One of the fundamental aims of the Regulation is to guarantee judicial protection, which requires free access to Member State courts and is opened through the jurisdictional heads in the Regulation.
There are voices who dismiss this judicial protection as a "general ideological postulate".
48 This is not the case at all. All jurisdictional heads grant a right to access a forum that is legitimate under the Regulation. 49 This is supported by Article 6(2) EU Treaty together with Article 13 Human Rights Convention, 50 46 The House of Lords' focus becomes clear when considering that the question submitted to the ECJ was: "Is the order consistent with the Regulation?" (West Tankers (HL), supra n 6). Hoffmann's arguments concern the issues of protecting party autonomy, where an arbitration agreement takes effect or whether the English proceedings are within the scope of the Regulation. In the same way, the ECJ invalidates the argumentations of, eg, Schlosser, Clarke and Gross, which all focus on the injunctive proceedings. See Illmer and Aumann, supra n 19, 155 for an extensive interpretation of the arbitration exception. 47 See Steinbrück supra n 19, 367, 368; E Peel, "Arbitration and Anti-suit Injunctions in the EU" Schlosser, supra n 18, 490 ("ideologisches Allgemeinpostulat"). 49 See Dutta and Heinze, supra n 19, 453, 454; Kropholler, supra n 36, Art 27, para 20 JR. 50 See Treaty on European Union, Art 6: "(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law." See European Convention for the Protection of the Human Rights Convention, Art 13 -Right to an effective remedy: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority [ 205, 208, 209 , where he uses Arts 6 and 13 Human Rights Convention to establish an exemption to the fi rst seised rule for unduly long proceedings. Art 6 Human Rights Convention, however, does not grant a right to access a certain court: see Dutta and Heinze, supra n 19, 453. which are binding for the interpretation of the Regulation. The importance of access to the legitimate forum is recognised by both the Heidelberg Report and the German courts.
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On the other hand, there is an agreement through which the parties, freely and wilfully, agree not to use these jurisdictional rules. This has to be duly considered. The question is to what extent parties can waive their right to access the courts.
Within the Regulation, jurisdiction originates at the very moment the prerequisites of the jurisdictional head in question are fulfi lled. The jurisdiction and the power to rule on it "already exist" and are activated the moment a party decides to use them. 52 Therefore, although both courts and tribunals may be entrusted to decide on the existence of an agreement, surely the tribunal (or, for that matter, the courts supporting it) is not in any better position than the court whose default jurisdiction "has been taken away" -on the contrary. This does not mean that the court with default jurisdiction should decide on the existence of an arbitration agreement in every case, but defi nitely always then when a party wants to use this court as he is entitled to. Otherwise, a party could avoid court proceedings just by alleging that there is an arbitration agreement.
53 If anti-suit injunctions can basically impede a party to act in court, then the other party would have no means by which to defend himself against that allegation before a national court as he is entitled to by his right to judicial protection -the right to object to the tribunal's alleged jurisdiction by bringing court proceedings where the default jurisdiction lies.
Nevertheless, one could argue that ex post legal protection through a court after an award is adequate.
54 This is not the case. It is often too late to bring 51 See Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 2007 (The Heidelberg Report -hereinafter referred to as "the Report"), para 890: "However, a major drawback would be that in case of the nullity of the agreement a party seeking to establish this nullity needs to seise fi rst the court designated by the void agreement before proceedings can be instituted with other courts. Therefore, such a far reaching modifi cation of Article 27 JR, ie the reversal of its priority rule in favour of the designated court, does not appear to balance the jurisdictional interests of the parties adequately". See also Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, supra n 19, 261: a fair and constitutional procedure is only guaranteed where everyone involved is able participate without limitations and it is the courts' duty to enforce this right to participate ("Ein rechtsstaatlich ordnungsgemäßes Gerichtsverfahren ist -was keiner näheren Erläuterung bedarf -nur gewährleistet wenn die Beteiligten ohne jede Beschränkung alle ihrer Ansicht nach notwendigen Fakten unterbreiten und alle notwendigen Anträge stellen können. Die Gerichte sind verpfl ichtet diesen Rechten Geltung zu verschaffen.").
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I allow myself to use a metaphor: the jurisdiction is a pre-existing road leading to one town, which equals the decision on the merits by a national court, and the arbitration agreement is a road sign, set up to divert traffi c towards another town. Whoever wants to drive on that road has to follow that sign only if it is set up properly. It should be the town where the sign stands that is rightly entitled to decide if the sign is set up properly. An example may be Art 1458 I of the Nouveau Code Procedure Civile, under which the tribunal is granted the fi rst right to examine the arbitration agreement, subject to court supervision: a dispute to court after arbitration. 55 Furthermore, the party opposing arbitration will be faced with an enforceable award while the court proceedings take place. Furthermore, it is not often clear if a valid agreement exists should the sueing party indeed breach the agreement. 56 Thus, in cases where the existence of an arbitration clause is disputed as a jurisdictional issue it can hardly be guaranteed that the parties have indeed reached a consensus as to whether they want to waive their right to access the courts. 57 A court second seised (for an anti-suit injunction) should not anticipate this decision.
Arbitration agreements should be subject to the same limits as every contract. If an obligation from a contract of sale -to deliver goods -is allegedly not fulfi lled, the party cannot simply take the goods. He must bring an action before a court with jurisdiction in order to allow the other party to defend himself. Access to court has a protective function. If an obligation from an arbitration agreement -to invoke a private tribunal -is allegedly not fulfi lled, the party typically "takes the goods" as he will bring an action before that tribunal. Nonetheless, the other party's right to defend himself before the court that would have jurisdiction without the agreement must remain.
The entitlement to legal protection before a national court is one level. The determination as to whether that action constitutes a breach of the agreement is another, substantive, level. It might lead to compensation, as in every contract, but should be strictly distinguished from ensuring the legal protection.
On a procedural level, legal protection must prevail over private autonomy and, thus, an objection to the jurisdiction of a tribunal before a national court over the application for the anti-suit injunction. That is what justifi es the single focus and why it is not necessary that both proceedings are within the scope of the Regulation, but just the one that ensures judicial protection.
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There has been criticism towards the "ban of effects" 59 imposed on proceedings that the ECJ itself holds as being outside the scope of the Regulation, See Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 435. See also Schlosser, supra n 18, 491. This is also exemplifi ed, eg, by the Through Transport case, supra n 12. 57 See West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, para 67. Advocate General Kokott explains that this is a reason why this solution indeed respects party autonomy. 58 Thus, ensuring legal protection may be added to the conditions the creation of primary obligations through an arbitration agreement is subject to, as pointed out by Lord Diplock The same two schools of legal reasoning collide when determining whether the Regulation applies to the abusive proceedings and how this may be infl uenced by the arbitration agreement.
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One view is to take a broad approach and regard all arising disputes as completely removed from national courts at the outset, including the dispute on the jurisdiction to examine the agreement. 63 The other view takes account primarily of the substantive subject-matter of the dispute and separates the question of the existence of the agreement. 64 It is the distinction drawn by the ECJ in Rich that is decisive. The court held that when determining the scope, reference must be made solely to the subjectmatter of the dispute. The subject-matter may concern only arbitration 65 -but it may as well not. "A preliminary issue which the court must resolve (fi rst) 66 in order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify the application."
67 Thus, what in Rich could not have the effect of making the Regulation applicable, cannot coherently be used in the mirror case to make the basically applicable Regulation unapplicable.
68
While this distinction has been criticised as artifi cial and impractical, some critics themselves admit that it is probably the only workable approach. See West Tankers (ECJ), supra n 1, para 25. 63 See Fentiman, supra n 60, 279. See also, generally, Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 434; West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, paras 39 et seq. 64 See Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 432; West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, paras 43, 44. 65 See Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 432: "Proceedings which are directly concerned with arbitration as the principal issue . . . are not covered by the Convention".
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Added by the author. 67 See Rich, supra n 23, para 26. 68 See also Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 434, n 105 concerning the irrelevance of incidental questions to determine the civil nature of claims. according to the nature of the preliminary issue. 70 As a result, the broad view must be dismissed.
The protection of party autonomy constitutes a weaker counter-argument in this context than it did above. If the parties bargained in order to be outside any national court system whatsoever, the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and the grant of an anti-suit injunction through a national court must consequently constitute a violation of the agreement as well.
The chosen interpretation also respects the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the court, especially in those cases where the tribunal is not yet formed and the principle cannot apply. The jurisdiction to examine the existence of an arbitration agreement should not depend on such a coincidental fact, as it would lead to uncertainty, especially considering the fact that the formation of the tribunal might already cause problems and delays, as exemplifi ed in Rich.
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This does not mean that a tribunal is degraded to some kind of second-class institution or that there is no trust in arbitrators -on the contrary: the private tribunal has a better position than any second-seised court in a Member State. Its (relative) Kompetenz-Kompetenz remains unaffected. 72 The arbitral proceedings fall under Article 1(2)(d) JR and cannot impair any effectiveness, as the tribunal as a private institution is not bound by the Regulation.
Finally, according to Article II(3) New York Convention a court is entitled to examine an arbitration agreement before referring it. 73 Thus, it is obvious that tribunals are not exclusively entitled to that examination. According to the rationale of Article 1(2)(d) JR, which is to comply with international conventions, the powers under the Regulation cannot be more limited than those under the Convention. See Rich, supra n 23, where the appointment of arbitrators was disputed.
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The Kompetenz-Kompetenz of tribunals is only relative, as, although they can go on with their proceedings and render an award, their award may be set aside or not recognised, eg under Art V NYC or § 1040 para 3 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure).
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Art II NYC provides: "(1) Each Contracting State shall recognise an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defi ned legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration. . . . (3) The court of a Contracting State, when seised of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it fi nds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed". 74 See West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, para 56.
(c) The Anti-suit Injunction: Indirect Interference Undermining the Effectiveness of the Regulation
Lastly, there is no doubt that an anti-suit injunction constitutes an indirect interference in foreign proceedings.
75 Lord Hoffmann's argument that this was "divorced from reality" 76 is, respectfully, simply not suffi ciently legally founded to counter what was decided in Turner and, moreover, a misquote from Peter Schlosser. 77 Although the anti-suit injunction is aimed at a person it takes effect, intended or not, on the court proceedings. Court proceedings need a plaintiff in order to take place. If the plaintiff is restrained from doing his bit a court cannot rule. 78 Thus, even where the plaintiff agreed not to do anything in national courts, this cannot matter at the point where the court has the right to rule on its jurisdiction.
This interference undermines the effectiveness of the Regulation in reaching its goal of developing a unifi ed internal market where the free movement of decisions ensures both legal protection and certainty. 79 The base for free movement are the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, as shown in Gasser and Turner.
The fact that there are no uniform rules for arbitration matters does not mean that the principles cannot be affected. 80 Although there is no such thing as a general trust outside the Regulation, 81 there is force in the argument that the principles go beyond mere jurisdictional concerns, as they derive from the goal of recognition rather than from unifi cation. 82 Consequently, they apply regardless of jurisdiction rules as long as the decision to be recognised is within the scope of the Regulation. The decision to be made in Syracuse was within this scope. Instead, the English court indirectly impeded a ruling on that jurisdiction although it was not better placed, as every court is empowered, and 75 Agreeing: West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, para 26; Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 428; Illmer and Aumann, supra n 19, 156; Peel, supra n 47, 366; C Ambrose, "Can Anti-suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law?" (2003) See West Tankers (HL), supra n 6, para 17.
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Peter Schlosser's expression "lebensfremd" (which Lord Hoffmann translates as "divorced from reality") is his counterargument to an argument brought forth against the qualifi cation of a proceeding brought for the grant of an anti-suit injunction as being ancillary to arbitration. See Schlosser, supra n 18, 489: "Eine Anti-Suit injunction zu dem Zweck . . . ist aber sicherlich schwerpunktmäßig ein Nebenverfahren. . . . Dagegen ist eingewandt worden. . . . Dieses Argument ist aber lebensfremd." Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 436. must be trusted, to determine it itself. For the same reason the grant of antisuit injunctions also impedes the effectiveness of Article 35(3) JR as it amounts to a revision of the jurisdiction ex ante. 83 Also, there can be no free circulation of judgments where there is the risk that judgments may not be recognised because they are reached in breach of an anti-suit injunction.
As already noted, it is not even clear in all cases if a valid agreement exists. Thus, the effectiveness of the system of jurisdictional heads is also undermined where an anti-suit injunction is granted. This system has a protective function. The right of access to a national court can only be effective where the court which has jurisdiction as a default has the power to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement, ie to rule on that right to access.
Therefore, the sensible conclusion reached by the ECJ was that anti-suit injunctions are no good for Europe.
D. EUROPE AFTER WEST TANKERS
Implications Following from West Tankers and the Anti-suit Injunction Debate
(a) Implications Following from West Tankers
After West Tankers, the reasoning in The Ivan Zagubanski and Through Transport was no longer sustainable. However, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of tribunals remains untouched. This means that tribunals may decide on their jurisdiction and the merits, irrespective of court proceedings. Once constituted, they may also grant anti-suit injunctions themselves. According to sections 38(1) and 48(1) Arbitration Act 1996, parties may confer upon the tribunal powers that may be even greater than those available to courts. 84 This has two consequences: (i) there is an imbalance between the powers of the tribunal and the supervising courts, as tribunals now de facto have more powers; (ii) there is a, maybe underestimated, risk of irreconcilable decisions. the latter. Consequently, the Regulation and the Convention clash with each other whenever both decisions are to be enforced.
Several solutions are discussed to solve this clash. For some, the Regulation simply does not apply to those judgments. 86 Some commentators rely on Article 71 JR and solve the problem using Article II(3) New York Convention as an overriding rule. 87 This seems to run counter to the Advocate General's statement that the Regulation, in fact, has got no mechanism to deal with this consequence. 88 Furthermore, the Convention is not able to solve the problem. It contains no jurisdictional rules, no procedural framework whatsoever and no provision regarding which law governs the validity of the arbitration agreement, neither in Article II(3) nor in Article V. 89 Others rely on the possibility of non-recognition of the judgment on grounds of public policy. 90 Finally, it is proposed to include arbitration into the Regulation. 91 This issue will be adressed further infra.
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Although not expressed by the ECJ in the judgment, the narrow interpretation of the arbitration exception might also infl uence a future practice of non-recognition of judgments that are perceived to be delivered in breach of an arbitration agreement by the recognising court in another Member State. The jurisdiction over the existence of the agreement and the non-recognition of resulting decisions are two sides of the same coin. Treating the latter as not impairing the Regulation's effectiveness could seem inconsistent.
However, if the parties do not agree to confer certain powers to the tribunal, it has the same powers as the courts to order a party to do or refrain from doing things (section 48(5) Arbitration Act 1996). As the wording suggests that the powers are merely derived from the courts' powers, it would be inconsistent 86 See National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion SA (The "Wadi Sudr") [2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep 666 (Comm). On the other hand, Ambrose, supra n 53, 17 says there is "consensus" that a judgment falls under the Regulation if its subject-matter is covered by the Regulation. This is supported by Phillip Alexander, supra n 17, para 106 and Oberlandesgericht Celle [1997] RIW 131. 87 See Beraudo, supra n 70, 22, 26; Magnus and Mankowski, supra n 50, Art 35 JR, para 49. 88 See West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, para 71, at 20 reaches the same conclusion. 89 See van Haersolte-van Hof, supra n 69, 33, 37; H van Houtte, "Why Not Include Arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction Regulation?" [2005] Arbitration International 509, 511, who remarks that there also is no institution comparable to the ECJ to control the application of the Convention; Ambrose, supra n 53, 13, 17, 18; Lehmann, supra n 54, 1647. ; National Navigation, supra n 86. While this may have the advantage of more clarity, one wonders why the ECJ bothered to protect the proceedings in Syracuse at all, if the judgment would be unenforceable. 91 See West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38, para 73; van Houtte, supra n 89, 518; Heidelberg Report, supra n 51, para 131. if in these particular cases the ECJ's ruling in West Tankers did not also stop the tribunal from granting an anti-suit injunction. 93 Furthermore, the Regulation now risks being open to exploitation. Parties might be dragged into litigation that exhausts their resources and thus impedes arbitration, 94 or feel pressured to compromise by the loss of confi dentiality. The fi rst-seised rule without doubt encourages tactical litigation. 95 However, unlike Member State courts, tribunals keep their Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In addition, the overall danger is softened by the fact that the anti-suit injunction remains available to court proceedings brought outside the European Community. 96 Here, it will need to be decided if the anti-suit injunction as a procedural means is to be preserved as long as possible. It may very well be that the ECJ's ruling is an expression of the more general view that anti-suit injunctions are no good at all.
(b) Anti-suit Injunctions: Do We Need them At All?
The classic argument in favour of the anti-suit injunction is its effectiveness in promoting legal certainty and preventing confl icting judgments. Effective as it undeniably is, critics rightly remark that it is so only as long as it is imposed one-sidedly. 97 Moreover, the inherent risk in allowing fl exibility through broad discretionary tools is that the court using discretion may eventually "arrogate" 98 to itself a competence that deliberately has not been created. 99 It does not seem at all likely that English courts would recognise anti-suit injunctions which, for a change, are targeted at them. 100 Also, the alleged certainty resulting from the use of anti-suit injunctions exists only prima facie. The fact that non-English courts will not recognise anti-suit injunctions in cases where the respondent decides to continue the proceedings disregarding the anti-suit injunction nec- See Clifford and Browne, supra n 37, 22; Fentiman, supra n 60, 281; Mankowski, supra n 61, 28.
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There is no consent on how often frustrating tactics are used. For example, Lehmann, supra n 54, claims it is not seldom, while Mankowksi, supra n 61, alleges it does not happen frequently. 96 See Clifford and Browne, supra n 37, 22. N Sharp, "Compatibility of Anti-suit Injunction with the Brussels Regulation" [2008] International Arbitration Law Review N77, N79 has "no doubt" anti-suit injunctions will be continued to be granted outside Europe. essarily leads to confl icting judgments, 101 as English courts, in turn, will not recognise the judgment delivered in disregard of the anti-suit injunction. Moreover, the latter benefi t can take effect only in England, 102 so that certainty is promoted only in cases in which the enforcement will be sought in England.
The proposed use of anti-suit injunctions by other courts 103 would cause chaos in terms of certainty once confl icting anti-suit injunctions are granted. 104 The step to the anti-anti-anti-suit-injunction and so forth would be only a matter of time. Where will that lead when English courts are already reluctant to recognise a judgment delivered in breach of an anti-suit injunction or foreign anti-suit injunctions targeted at them? The procedural skirmishing whilst "torpedoing" the agreement would only be substituted through skirmishing with anti-suit injunctions. Jurisdiction would depend on which party is more likely to be scared by an anti-suit injunction. All certainty would be lost.
At this point it should be remembered that in the European Community the development of an internal market is still a goal that has yet to be reached. 105 The alleged competitive disadvantage is, in the worst case, pure protectionism for the business which arbitration brings to London, 106 as anti-suit injunctions are regularly only granted to protect English courts. 107 At best, it is not backed up by any evidence that could prove why London should be worse off than other frequently used arbitration centres within Europe, which do not use anti-suit injunctions. 108 Indeed, it is true that the dangers for London "which still has a myriad of features to commend it to those selecting it" 109 are overestimated, considering that the availability of anti-suit injunctions is only one, rarely decisive, reason to choose the seat of arbitration, as well as the remaining availability of the antisuit injunction for non-EU proceedings. 110 In addition, the fact that London is chosen as the seat of arbitration does not mean that the anti-suit injunction will be automatically sought here. 111 Furthermore, the costs of an application for an anti-suit injunction may be underestimated. 112 Thus, it is questionable whether the use of anti-suit injunctions is something worth preserving at all costs or a beloved tradition that has to be let go. The last view seems preferable.
In any case, within Europe one must look to the future and to the pragmatic question: how else can party autonomy be protected and how can the remaining (or: caused) uncertainties be resolved?
Reactions of English Courts
There have been several reactions to the ECJ's ruling by English courts. They generally show the readiness to apply the ECJ's reasoning.
In Youell v La Reunion Aerienne the court relied on the ECJ's confi rmation in West Tankers that the applicability of the Regulation is determined by the nature of the rights which the proceedings serve to protect. 113 It held that the mere fact that a claim is the subject of an arbitration agreement does not deprive a court, which could otherwise determine the substance of the claim, of its jurisdiction. 114 The protected right was held to be the claimant's right not to be sued on a claim he denied. The court decided that it was not covered by the arbitration exclusion. 115 The court also applied West Tankers in holding the defendant's reliance on the agreement as "merely incidentally raised".
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In Shashoua v Sharma the court held that English law in relation to proceedings which did not take part in the European Community was not inconsistent with the Regulation or the Convention, although it had been submitted that the reasoning in West Tankers should apply to countries which were parties to any convention. 117 Thus, it seems, the courts are prepared to preserve the use 111 In DHL v Finmatica the court held that, as the ECJ had approved that determining the existence of an arbitration agreement in cases where jurisdiction under the Regulation is contested must be considered an incidental question within its scope, arguing this case otherwise would be diffi cult. 119 Regarding public policy, the court noted how the ECJ's ruling refl ects Article 35 JR and how "this may have implications for the court's approach to the review of a decision of the court of a Member State on the applicability of an arbitration agreement". 120 In combination with Articles 36 and 45(2) JR, the court saw little scope for examining the Italian court's application of its own law. 121 But, Tomlinson J also mentioned that a court might in principle consider to what extent it is permitted to examine the substance of the conclusions of another Member State court regarding its own jurisdiction.
122
The most interesting case in terms of legal reasoning is National Navigation Co v Endesa. 123 In this case, a Spanish court held that arbitration clauses had not been incorporated into a charter for the transport of coal and that N had waived its right to arbitrate by bringing English proceedings.
124 N then alternatively applied to the English court for a declaration that the clauses had been validly incorporated, as well as for an anti-suit injunction.
The court held that it only had jurisdiction to hear the claim for declaration regarding the incorporation of the arbitration clauses. Concerning the case DHL appealed an order from an English court for an Italian judgment to be registered in England, alleging that it was outside the scope of the Regulation because it had been obtained in breach of an arbitration agreement, alternatively because registration was contrary to public policy. 120 Ibid, n 119, para 21. 121 Ibid, para 22. See also ibid, para 23: "Moreover I see no reason why, at any rate in the fi rst instance, the court should need to reach its own conclusion on matters of Italian law . . . relating to the question whether the Bankruptcy Receiver was bound by the arbitration agreement contained in the contract on which he sued. . . . In my judgment this question can be addressed fi rstly on the assumption that the Italian court was correct in its conclusions. . . . If the point arises, the court can consider whether the ambit of English public policy on these matters is or is not informed by the court's conclusion as to the correctness or otherwise of the Italian court's application of Italian law." 122 Ibid, para 23. 123 See National Navigation, supra n 86. In this case the Spanish defendant had suffered a loss during the transport of coal by the claimant, an English shipowner. Both relevant charters contained a London arbitration clause and proceedings were brought by both parties in Spain and in England. E brought court proceedings against N in Spain. On the same day, N sought a declaration of non-liability before the Commercial Court. N challenged the jurisdiction in the Spanish proceedings, E challenged vice versa. Later, N also brought arbitration proceedings in London. 124 The judgment was appealed and later stayed pending on the English court's decision on its jurisdiction.
other claims, none of the relevant charters submitted disputes to the jurisdiction of the English courts and, following West Tankers, Article 5(1) JR could not be applied because the claims fell within the arbitration exception. 125 The court held that an English court was not required to recognise the judgment of the Spanish court as binding because the English declaratory proceedings were outside the scope of the Regulation and, alternatively, it would be manifestly contrary to public policy. 126 The appeal against this decision has been allowed and the arbitration proceedings have been dismissed. 127 The Spanish judgment has to be recognised under Article 33 JR and can give rise to an issue estoppel as much in arbitration proceedings excluded from the Regulation as in any other proceedings in an English court. 128 The decision on whether an arbitration clause was incorporated into a contract is in most instances closely tied up with the merits of a contractual dispute and not separable. 129 Finally, giving effect to a judgment which has failed to give effect to an arbitration agreement does not amount to a manifest breach of a fundamental principle of English law and thus would not be against public policy. 
Alternative Remedies for Protecting Party Autonomy
Even without anti-suit injunctions, the party which intends to stick to the agreement 131 has several tactical options left. These can and should already be prepared during the drafting stage of the contract.
(a) Trust the Foreign Court
The fi rst option is to object to the jurisdiction of the court in the abusive proceedings and trust the court to decline it. 132 The risk that the dispute is not referred to arbitration is minimised by the obligation under Article II(3) New York Convention. Moreover, bringing arbitration proceedings remains possible anyway.
Some argue that objecting may be even less costly and more certain than applying for an anti-suit injunction.
133 However, and this should be stressed by 125 National Navigation, supra n 86 paras 65, 67. any advising lawyer, engaging the opponent in the abusive proceedings is vital and always necessary. Otherwise it might be held that the party waived his right from the arbitration agreement according to the principle of venire contra factum proprium, which would preclude all alternative remedies. 134 Thus, seen as the party must engage in court proceedings anyway, he is best advised to infl uence these.
(b) Take Part in the Race
The ECJ's interpretation of the Regulation seems to encourage a race to seising a court fi rst. 135 The party should therefore take part in the race and assure himself of a good tactical position.
136 If the conduct of the other party leads to suspicion that he is considering breaching the arbitration agreement and bringing court proceedings, the party should bring court proceedings fi rst, eg seeking a declaration. Thereby, he can ensure the choice of a forum with a fast civil procedure for deciding whether its courts have jurisdiction or Article II(3) New York Convention applies or, even better, a forum with a special preliminary procedure. 137 In addition, how the existence of the agreement will be judged may be more predictable in some fora. It is necessary, however, to make sure that the chosen court has jurisdiction under the Regulation and that by bringing the action the party does not waive his right to arbitration. 138 The claim, as such, is not a renouncement.
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This strategy can be prepared when negotiating the contract. A notifi cation requirement for potential actions, backed up by liquidated damages clauses in case of breach, will make sure that the party has enough time to be the fi rst in the race.
140
Two remarks are necessary: (i) the notifi cation requirement must not apply to a party who has already received a notifi cation, because otherwise any tactical advantage vanishes; (ii) the party has to consider whether the contract contains clauses which stop him bringing court actions, in order to avoid breaching the contract himself. However, such tactical backup positions per se may discour- 134 See Mankowksi, supra n 61, 25; Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 497, n 74. 135 See also Magnus and Mankowski, supra n 50, Introduction to Arts 27-30 JR, para 18. 136 age the other party from employing delaying tactics and in any case provide essential evidence.
141
The author is aware that lawyers in their everyday business do not devote as much energy to dispute resolution clauses as to the substantive contract clauses. However, the consequences that may arise in cases where arbitration is an issue show that a little more attention to the drafting of the clauses may be a good way to minimise the risk of subsequent problems.
142
In this context, it might be helpful, de lege ferenda, if more national legal systems enacted a fast preliminary procedure in order to impede frustrating tactics. 143 Likewise, a protocol for the uniform interpretation of the Convention is a thoughtful proposal, 144 as it would foster uniformity and certainty regarding the validity of arbitration agreements.
(c) Apply for an Anti-suit Injunction to the Arbitral Tribunal
Alternatively, the party may apply to a tribunal for an anti-suit injunction, if it is already constituted.
145 At the contracting stage, parties should be advised to put in express provisions giving the tribunal wide powers to grant injunctions. 146 As a minimum, they need to agree to confer powers upon the tribunal, as otherwise an anti-suit injunction is probably not going to be granted due to section 48(5) Arbitration Act 1996.
147
However, as the need for anti-suit injunctions regularly arises before the tribunal is constituted and the enforcement of the arbitral anti-suit injunction can be problematic, 148 this remedy is as yet rarely chosen.
(d) Rely on the Non-enforceability of the Foreign Judgment
The availability of this tactical option is intertwined with the issue of resolving the above-mentioned clash between the Regulation and the Convention because this clash is usually the ground cited for non-recognition.
Judgments delivered in Member States are entitled to recognition under Chapter III of the Regulation. English case-law has adopted a broad view of the arbitration exclusion not only in relation to jurisdiction and anti-suit injunctions but also to the recognition of judgments.
150 Indeed, The Heidberg seems to be the only case in which recognition was held to be required, even though the judgment was delivered in breach of an arbitration agreement.
151 Generally, those judgments are considered to be outside the scope of the Regulation or their recognition contrary to public policy.
Commentators distinguish between judgments on the merits delivered on a subject-matter within the scope of the Regulation, and those in which the existence of the agreement is the subject-matter. 152 While the latter are outside the scope of the Regulation, 153 things become "less straightforward" 154 where the existence of the arbitration agreement is decided merely as a preliminary issue.
Some suggest, mainly following the reasoning in Phillip Alexander v Bamberger, that a judgment rendered despite an arbitration agreement deemed valid by the recognising court should not have to be recognised, at least where rendered "in blatant disregard" 155 . 156 Others argue that if the main subject-matter is covered by the Regulation, its Article 35 applies and the judgment has to be recognised.
157
There are considerable arguments against recognition. From the beseeched court's point of view, this would equal disregarding party autonomy and further contributing to the confl ict between the Regulation and the Convention. This would run counter to recital 25 of the Regulation. Furthermore, the decision to stay court proceedings due to the Convention does not qualify as a Regulation judgment: why should it be otherwise, if the court chooses the other alternative? 158 Nonetheless, it seems that Ambrose is right when she says that any approach to non-recognition is "probably unworkable under the Regulation" as under its 150 wording "neither Art 71 nor public policy provide a fi rm foundation for refusing" recognition.
159
Whatever certainty there may have been regarding this issue, it has been, at the least, shaken by West Tankers. The decision left unclear whether a party can still rely on the non-recognition of a judgment that disregards an arbitration agreement. 160 The issue has now been adressed by National Navigation Co v Endesa, where the Court of Appeal has not hesitated to reverse an "EU-unfriendly" fi rst-instance decision, providing an admirably clear argumentation.
(i) The Reversed Decision -Classic Arguments in a New Context
Holding that the court did not have to recognise the Spanish judgment, the court in fi rst instance substantiated what had already been considered as an alternative in DHL v Finmatica. 162 Following West Tankers, it found that the Spanish judgment was within the scope of the Regulation. 163 Nonetheless, it held that Article 33(1) JR did not apply. 164 Taking into account West Tankers, Gloster J examined whether the declaration could have consequences which undermine 159 Ambrose, supra n 53, 20. To rely on Art 71 JR would simply mean overstretching the application of the Convention as it contains no rules adressing disputes on recognition, see Section D.1(a) supra. The public policy argument, however, has been used in English case-law: see Phillip Alexander, supra n 17; DHL, supra n 119; The Ivan Zagubanski, supra n 14; National Navigation, supra n 86. 160 Due to the rejection of the broad interpretation of the arbitration exception in the context of jurisdiction, even though recognition was not considered as an issue explicitly. 161 As it is the only one after West Tankers. 162 See supra n 119. The court adressed the issue distinguishing three sub-issues (see National Navigation, supra n 86, para 86): (1) Are the English proceedings within the scope of the Regulation? (2) Is the court therefore required to recognise the judgment pursuant to Art 33(1) of the Regulation? (3) If so, is it then entitled to refuse recognition on the grounds of public policy for the purpose of s 32 of the 1982 Act? 163 National Navigation, supra n 86, paras 88, 90. 164 Ibid, paras 92-95. Gloster J cites paras 50 and 51 from Through Transport, supra n 12: "50. A number of other questions which might arise under the Regulation were touched on in argument. In particular, there was some debate on the question whether the judgment of the District court of Kotka is entitled to recognition under article 33. However, we do not think that this question arises for decision at present. As we understand it, the judgment obtained to date is simply to the effect that that court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim by New India under the Finnish Act. That was essentially a matter for that court in proceedings which seem to us to be within the Regulation. Whether that judgment is entitled to recognition or not does not seem to us to be relevant to the question whether the judge was correct to grant the declarations or injunction which he did. 51. The fact that arbitration is excluded from the Convention means that from time to time there are likely to be confl icting judgments in different member states and it is therefore possible that questions of recognition and enforcement of confl icting judgments may arise in the future in a case like this. In our opinion such questions are best left for decision when and if they arise." She also cites from Advocate General Darmon's opinion in Rich, supra n 23: "88. . . . in no circumstances can the existence of another action pending before another court entail the result that application of the convention is extended to the dispute concerned it if was not already covered by the convention by virtue of its subject-matter. . . . 90. Without doubt, the objectives of the Brussels Convention are of decisive importance for the interpretation of those provisions. But a mere reference to those objectives cannot justify neglect of the requirements of legal consistency or total disre-the effectiveness of the Regulation. She did not think so. 165 The declaration, in the court's view, was meant to comply with the English courts' own and distinguishable obligation under the Convention to give effect to an arbitration agreement where it decided it had to under its own law. 166 The application of Spanish law was not reviewed, nor was the Spanish court prevented from exercising its substantive jurisdiction. 167 Gloster J held that this did not run counter to the principle of trust either, as the court's jurisdiction in the present case was outside the system created by the Regulation. 168 Even if the Regulation had to be applied, recognition could be refused under its Article 34. Citing Waller J, the court held that judgments in breach of agreements should not have to be recognised, regardless of whether they were decided as a preliminary or a main issue. 169 Article 35(3) JR would not apply in these cases, as the court would not be reviewing the judgment but rather making its own disapproval of the breach. 170 Considering the English courts' clear statutory and conventional obligations under section 9 Arbitration Act 1996, section 32 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 171 and Article II(3) New York Convention, policy dicgard for the consequences which necessarily follow from the logic of the instrument but which are regarded as inconvenient." 165 See National Navigation, supra n 86, para 97. The Spanish court at that point had already assumed jurisdiction and ruled. Thus it could not be stripped of any power (anymore), nor could there be any interference with an exclusive right to rule. This, Gloster J says, is the main difference to 168 Ibid, drawing on Advocate General Darmon's view in Rich, supra n 23, paras 76, 77: "Harmonisation of the solutions adopted by national courts does not constitute an aim in itself, at the expense of the specifi c features of the area concerned. . . . Necessarily, where one set of proceedings is outside the Regulation, there will always be a risk of confl icting judgments in different member states." For the same reason issues of comity did not arise. 169 See Phillip Alexander, supra n 17, (obiter) paras 111-14. 170 Ibid. 171 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. S 32 reads as follows:
"(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a judgment given by a court of an overseas country in any proceedings shall not be recognised or enforced in the United Kingdom if (a) the bringing of those proceedings in that court was contrary to an agreement under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in the courts of that country; and tates to give effect to an agreement whenever it is held valid by that court, 172 which Gloster J did.
It is noticeable, how many of the classic arguments that have already been mantioned earlier now return in the context of recognition.
(ii) Reversal by the Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal disagreed with that reasoning. Interestingly, Waller J himself was involved in that decision. He appreciates as "seductive" the respondent's argument that judgments are severable and that the question as to the effect of a judgment on a preliminary ruling was not before the ECJ. 174 This would allow the reasoning in West Tankers to be disregarded for matters of recognition and constitute a way to solve the lack of reciprocity following from that reasoning. 175 However, the court found the argument irreconcilable with the decisions in Rich and West Tankers. A court's judgment on a preliminary issue cannot be viewed in isolation from the principal subject-matter of the proceedings for the purpose of recognition and enforcement. 176 The Spanish court determined whether an arbitration agreement existed merely as a step on the way to determining the substantive dispute.
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Gloster J was not right in holding that, because the arbitration proceedings fell outside the regulation, a regulation judgment would not be binding in those proceedings. In matters of recognition, primacy has to be given to the nature of the proceedings in which the judgment was given rather than to the one (b) those proceedings were not brought in that court by, or with the agreement of, the person against whom the judgment was given; and (c) that person did not counterclaim in the proceedings or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of that court. (3) In determining whether a judgment given by a court of an overseas country should be recognised or enforced in the United Kingdom, a court in the United Kingdom shall not be bound by any decision of the overseas court relating to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1) or (2). (4) Nothing in subsection (1) shall affect the recognition or enforcement in the United Kingdom of (a) a judgment which is required to be recognised or enforced there under the 1968 Convention or the Lugano Convention or the Regulation." 172 See National Navigation, supra n 86, para 102. The argumentation of Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 498, where they draw a parallel to Hoffmann v Krieg seems similar. For a different view, see Rauscher, supra n 36, Art 1 JR, para 31c. 173 Especially the "outside the scope"-argument, see supra Section B.2. 174 See National Navigation (CA), supra n 127, para 46. 175 The lack of reciprocity is referred to ibid, para 41. 176 Ibid, para 104. 177 Ibid. Thus, the court concludes that proceedings can be treated as relating to two or more different subject matters and the consequent judgment as falling partly within and partly outside the scope of the Regulation only in cases where they embrace more than one principal subject matter, so that the determination of one is not a step on the way to the determination of another and cannot therefore be classed as a preliminary issue.
of the subsequent proceedings, in which a party seeks to rely on it. 178 There is nothing in Chapter III of the Regulation to indicate that recognition depends on the nature of the proceedings currently before the court. Recognition as such is not defi ned, but means no more than conferring on the judgment the same authority as would be accorded to it in the Member State in which it was given.
179 Also, the notion that a court may be obliged to recognise a foreign judgment in one set of proceedings, but not in another, would be anomalous.
180
Section 32(4) Arbitration Act 1996 leads to a binding nature of the foreign decision. 181 In the same way it would be anomalous if the principal issue is such that the proceedings are to be treated as falling within the Regulation, whereas a judgment given in those proceedings would not be, as the question of recognition is in the background of any decision.
182
Gloster J was wrong to rely on the reasoning used in Through Transport (in its paragraphs 50 and 51), as the question of res judicata did not arise on any issue for decision in that case. 183 In the eyes of the court, CMA v Hyundai cannot offer any support either. Whether or not a court is acting under section 32 Arbitration Act 1996 cannot make any difference to the question as to whether an English court is bound by a Regulation judgment. 184 Thus, even if the arbitrators in this case were entitled to disregard the Spanish judgment, courts cannot properly do so. 185 Moreover, it seems that the Court of Appeal takes the view that tribunals too have to recognise foreign court judgments. 181 See ibid, paras 53, 69: "It does not follow that the ECJ would encourage inconsistent decisions and where the court dealing with the case on the merits has ruled ' no arbitration clause' before an English court is asked to consider that question, the ECJ would be likely to encourage the notion that another member state should be bound by that decision. Section 32(4) simply leads to that result." 182 See ibid, para 93. 183 See National Navigation (CA), supra n 127, paras 51, 121. See Through Transport, supra n 12, para 50 " [W] hether that judgment is entitled to recognition or not does not seem to us to be relevant." See also ibid, para 51: "[I]t is therefore possible that questions of recognition and enforcement of confl icting judgments may arise in the future in a case like this. In our opinion such questions are best left for decision when and if they arise." 184 See ibid, paras 56, 119. 185 See ibid, para 118. Furthermore, it seems to Waller J that the judge's conclusion in CMA, supra n 150, is contrary to the judgment of the ECJ in West Tankers, see ibid, para 57. 186 See ibid, para 118: "It is quite true that the Regulation itself does not apply to arbitral tribunals and that arbitrators are not therefore bound by the Regulations themselves to recognise judgments of the courts of Member States of the EU, but it does not follow that foreign judgments, whether of the courts of Member States or other countries, can be disregarded in arbitration proceedings. A judgment of a foreign court which is regarded under English of confl icts of laws rules as having jurisdiction and which is fi nal and conclusive on the merits is entitled to recognition at common law. It follows, therefore, that arbitrators applying English law are bound to give effect to that rule."
Regarding public policy, the court noted that Phillip Alexander v Bamberger was decided in a different context and in a pre-West Tankers era. 187 Where a party is entitled to challenge the incorporation of a clause in proceedings which lead to a judgment that has be to recognised under the Regulation, there is no room for the argument that a fundamental principle in terms of Krombach v Bamberski is infringed by the recognition of the judgment.
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The obligation under the Convention to give effect to arbitration agreements does not require the English courts not to be bound by a decision of a court of a fellow Member State and co-signatory of the Convention that there was no arbitration clause.
(iii) Critique
The Court of Appeal's decision has to be welcomed. It resolves uncertainties regarding questions of recognition in an EC-friendly way in the same way West Tankers has settled the debate over the scope of the arbitration exeception as "the latest step in a consistent line of authority". 190 And it does so rightfully. What follows from the fact that the English proceedings are outside the scope of the Regulation is simply that the English judgment is not recognisable under it. Thus, the only remaining reason why Article 33 JR should not apply is that recognition is not formally sought. Moreover, Article 33 JR does not distinguish between proceedings when it imposes recognition. On the contrary. The fact that Article 33 (2) JR specifi es cases where the recognition is a principal issue allows the argument e contrario that the obligation in Article 33(1) JR exists in every proceeding, declaratory proceedings included. The principle of trust, as seen supra, 191 applies as long as the decision to be recognised is within the scope of the Regulation. There is no room for "scope-based" argumentation. And -to use the Court of Appeal's words -it would be anomalous to protect proceedings from interferences before the ruling only to allow the same result through non-recognition. The interesting question is whether, conversely, this is applicable to the arbitral anti-suit injunction.
192
The scope of this article does not allow exploration of this issue. However, the latest ruling of the Court of Appeal suggests that the arbitral anti-suit injunction may very well be the next in line to fall. In principle, due to its Kompetenz-Kompetenz, a tribunal is entitled to rule on its own jurisdiction independently from what a national court in another Member State may have ruled. The Regulation is not applicable and will remain inapplicable even if it is amended as proposed and arbitration will be included. 193 As we have just seen, non-recognition of the foreign ruling by the courts is no longer an option to resolve clashes. In addition, there is a dictum in the Court of Appeal's decision suggesting that even a tribunal (though being outside the scope of the Regulation) may have to recognise foreign proceedings. 194 In such a case it would also be anomalous to allow granting of arbitral anti-suit injunctions even though this is deemed to be bound to give effect to the judgments of foreign courts under English Law, even where they disregard arbitration agreements.
However, there is no need to curtail the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in such a way. The concern adressed by West Tankers -judicial protection -a priori can only be and is warranted through national courts. A tribunal may decide to take its own view as long as, in principle, there is a chance to address the issue in front of a national court as well. The need to guarantee both judicial protection and the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of arbitral tribunals as one of the pillars of the independent arbitration process necessarily leads to the risk of confl icting decisions that has already been mentioned. Nevertheless, none of these principles should be given up. The need to preserve both principles and the fact that this leads to two parallel "uncontrollable" lines of decision-making (by a court on the one hand and a tribunal on the other) in this author's view makes it to a certain extent obvious that the solution for avoiding clashes can only lie in aligning the two lines of decision-making. Where there is just a small chance that the two decision-makers will apply different criteria when assessing the validity of an arbitration agreement, the risk in guaranteeing both judicial protection and Kompetenz-Kompetenz vanishes. This is exactly what has been proposed.
195
Of course, concerning arbitral anti-suit injunctions, the aforementioned reservations concerning the use of anti-suit injunctions remain valid.
Regarding the public policy argument, it may be argued that where a clash between the Regulation and the Convention is tolerated as an, undesired, consequence, it must be tolerated a maiore ad minus that a national court follows its own obligation under the Convention to give effect to arbitration. However, the clash in this context is precisely based on the assumption that both award and judgment are enforceable.
In addition, the requirement of "manifest" reasons for refusal under Article 34(1) JR, 196 has to be construed narrowly, due to the wide nature of the policy 193 See infra n 252. 194 See supra n 186. 195 See infra Section D.4. 196 To the contrary -Gloster J hesitates twice, see National Navigation, supra n 86, paras 97, 101.
exception, 197 as it has been by the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, Article 35 (1) JR carries a strong argument e contrario against non-recognition. 198 It seems that the German approach is to recognise judgments delivered in other Member States as binding, except for in exceptional and narrow circumstances. 199 The, very general, obligation of a court under the Convention is not likely to qualify as such.
(e) Bringing Proceedings for Damages in the Forum at the Seat of Arbitration
Finally, the party could sue the other party for damages before the courts at the seat of arbitration. English case-law suggests that basically damages are available where an agreement not to use certain courts is breached. 200 The scope of this article does not allow exploration of these claims for damages in depth, though they are covered by commentators. 201 Primarily relevant for the issue discussed here is the question: are damages available after West Tankers? For some, such damage claims are not compatible with the Regulation per se, as they merely replace one litigation with another and run counter to the obligation to recognise a judgment delivered in another Member State. 202 For others, they are permissible and not a question of nonrecognition or reviewing another court's performance, because they focus on the party's wrongful conduct. 203 The principle of non-revision is signifi cant. The close connection and identical aims of damages and anti-suit injunctions as remedies suggest that the ECJ's disapproval of the latter might be sustained for the same reasons regarding damage claims. 204 However, the Report states that Turner does not seem to directly exclude the possibility of enforcing damages or related collateral remedies and that the issue needs to be further explored. 205 An interference with a power to rule in terms of West Tankers is not possible, as the other court will already have ruled. Also, the view that awarding damages does not constitute a review of jurisdiction seems preferable. When ruling on damages, the court merely compares two situations: the actual, indeed recognising the other court's decision, 206 and the hypothetical, where no court proceedings were brought that could be reviewed. 207 The subject-matter before the court is to determine whether the arbitration agreement has been breached. The other court's incidental decision on the existence of the agreement as a preliminary issue in order to determine its jurisdiction would be merely considered as a consequence of a possible breach. Similarly, so would the eventual decision of that court to decide on the merits of the, different, subject-matter. 208 The real problem is of an eventual issue preclusion. 209 If the English court is precluded from judging the existence differently to the foreign court, there may be no agreement that can be breached. Supposing there is no preclusion, another problem arises: damages are secondary obligations. The primary right they would derive from -the right not to be sued elsewhere -has been denied by the ECJ. 210 In other words: "Who says B must also say A." 211 Due to the fact that there is no injunctive relief available, awarding damages also may run counter to the rationale underpinning the inhibition of anti-suit injunctions through the ECJ.
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Finding a solution to these problems is challenging, as all positions that can be taken have plausible arguments on their side.
The fi rst problem concerns the scope of issue preclusion. The judgment needs to be recognised -but to what extent? The scope is estimated differently by commentators.
213 English case-law on the issue is ambiguous. 214 However, denying preclusion -though cautiously -seems the more sensible approach. It is true that the foreign judgment must be treated as if it were an English judgment, 215 but even som issue preclusion should apply only to what has been 209 The terms collateral estoppel or res iudicata are used interchangeably to issue preclusion. Res iudicata, though, concerns the complete relitigation of the same cause of action, whereas issue preclusion concerns the relitigation of controversial issues that were decided in another judgment: see Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 563, 564. However, the same principles apply to both, see ibid, 574. 210 The ECJ held that it must be possible to object in front of a national court to the other party's allegation of a right not to be sued. This is only possible where proceedings can be brought in that court. Consequently, a procedural right not to be sued does not exist. 211 Mankowksi, supra n 61, 30. 212 See ibid. See also Geimer, supra n 19, 381, para 1122 for a different view, though before West Tankers. 213 Pro issue estoppel is Merrett, supra n 202, 336. Contra issue estoppel and denying a "direct confl ict" is Mankowksi, supra n 61, 31. Also contra is Rauscher, supra n 36, Art 2 JR, para 20i. Without conclusion: Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 451, who says it "is impossible to predict". See also, more generally, ibid, 569 et seq. 214 See The Sennar (No 2), supra n 209. See also Evans LJ in Desert Sun Loan Corporation v Hill [1996] ILPr 406, paras 38, 40: "Whilst, therefore, Lord Brandon's formulation is wide enough to embrace a foreign court's decision on a purely procedural issue. I do not read his judgment as extending that far. . . . I would be prepared to hold that an issue estoppel could arise from an interlocutory judgment of a foreign court on a procedural i.e. non-substantive issue. 216 This is also the approach taken in § 322(1) Zivilprozeßordnung. 217 The preliminary and incidental decision on the existence of the agreement is a prerequisite for the foreign court's ruling, but it is not intended to have substantive infl uence on the decision on the subject-matter. 218 The foreign court does not determine substantive rights and obligations of the parties. 219 Articles 32 and 33 JR do not prescribe that the whole reasoning in the judgment is automatically binding.
220 Caution in applying issue preclusion is especially acute where it is the defendant in the foreign proceedings who tries to reopen the issue.
221
This approach does not run counter to Articles 28 or 35(3) JR either. The latter impedes reviewing the determination of jurisdiction in a specifi c judgment. But, as has been seen, the foreign judgment is not reviewed. E contrario, the fact that Article 35(3) JR needs to establish a separate obligation not to review the jurisdiction allows the interpretation that Article 33(1) JR does not cover the resolution of jurisdictional issues. Article 28 JR merely establishes an obligation to stay proceedings. As the foreign court's judgment is a prerequisite for assessing the amount of damages, a stay would be necessary anyway. Section 33(1) 1982 Act is also used to argue against issue preclusion in cases of objecting to a foreign jurisdiction, but without exploring the impact of section 33(2).
222
Nevertheless, the paradoxical outcome remains that awarding damages could mean reversing the foreign decision 223 by deleting its effects -a "nonrecognition through recognition". Also, the fact that a victorious claimant in one Member State might possibly be judged to have breached an agreement through that very victory 224 does not exactly support legal certainty. has been decided substantively (materielle Rechtskraft). Decisions concerning jurisdiction, especially where made incidental to the decision on the subject-matter, are not a part of it: see Mankowksi, supra n 61, 31. 218 See also Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 575: "The court may have recited those considerations on which the judgment was formally based, but without intending them to have the status of decisions on the particular points." See further Schlosser, supra n 202, 123. He says that issue preclusion can only apply where the foreign judgment is aimed at encompassing a claim for damages due to a breach of the arbitration agreement, which is almost never the case. 219 For the consequences, see Magnus and Mankowski, supra n 50, Art 33 JR, para 4. 220 See Mankowksi, supra n 61, 31. 221 See ibid. See also Rogerson, supra n 210, 97. 222 See Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 575. 223 See Pfeiffer, supra n 20, 82. See also Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 451; Merrett, supra n 202, 334. 224 See Pfeiffer, supra n 20, 82. See also Steinbrück, supra n 19, 369: "A party initiating state court proceedings abroad is not breaking a contract for tactical purposes but merely invoking a legally available jurisdiction under the Regulation."
However, it can be argued that awarding damages, instead of reversing the foreign judgment, ties in with and balances the overall effects. The strongest point remains that the foreign judgment simply is not concerned with damages for breaching the arbitration agreement. 225 Another way to minimise the paradoxical outcome is to limit the amount of available damages to what would have been available before the foreign court. 226 Overall, it may be recommendable that the party relies exclusively on the protection that the foreign forum provides from abusive proceedings.
227
Turning to the second problem, what the ECJ decided needs to be considered very carefully. It denied a procedurally enforceable right not to be sued. 228 The ECJ was not concerned with private rights, 229 it only assured the availability of judicial protection and the mutual trust between courts to correctly decide their jurisdiction according to the Regulation.
Once judicial protection is assured, and thus a procedural protection of party autonomy denied, there is no reason why it should not be possible to decide on a substantive protection through damages in another forum with jurisdiction over that subject-matter.
The sanctity of bargains can be protected only where a consensus indeed exists. 230 This consensus, however, can be established differently, according to the law applicable in different fora. And there is no reason why it should not be protected where it is found to exist, provided the court is allowed to decide. In this context, only the subject-matter is relevant. 231 Thus, judging the existence of an arbitration agreement when faced with the question whether there is jurisdiction to decide a delictual claim is separable from considering it when faced with the decision of whether that agreement has been breached. The underlying problem is that arbitration agreements may be considered valid in one Member State and not in another.
This, indeed, means that from time to time there are likely to be differing decisions. 232 However, there seems to be no reason why the effectiveness of the Regulation could be impaired in the same way by a substantive protection of party autonomy as it was by the procedural protection.
Bearing in mind that the Regulation, according to its recital 14, also protects private autonomy, the opportunity should be taken to enforce private bargains 225 For the same reason the foreign court's cost-decision is not reversed through awarding damages: see Mankowksi, supra n 61, 32 and Schlosser, supra n 202, 122, 123. 226 Mankowksi, supra n 61, 31 227 Dutta and Heinze, supra n 19, 458. 228 Mankowksi, supra n 61, 30, recognises that the ECJ denied the primary obligation "in its procedural dress". 229 Merrett, supra n 202, 332. 230 See West Tankers (AG's opinion), supra n 38. 231 According to Rich, supra n 23 and West Tankers above. 232 See supra n 168.
on the substantive level. Where the parties are protected from a public law perspective, the ECJ may show sensibility towards commercial needs.
However, this is a fi eld where future clarifi cation is needed. The Court of Appeal has provided useful and correct guidance for the question of recognition that may also have an infl uence in this context. If public policy does not require valid arbitration agreements to be enforced, the same coniderations may, in principle, be applied to enforcing connected damages. 233 The ECJ's view on how detachable secondary claims are from the primary obligation under the Regulation may also contribute to solving the issue.
Parties may also agree on damages contractually through indemnity and/or liquidated damages clauses. 234 The determination in advance of the amount of damages eliminates all problems connected with the assessment of the damage and makes it easier to bring a claim. For some, these clauses also are impermissible following the ratio underlying West Tankers.
235
Under German law, the best solution would be to insert penalty clauses as they are not secondary rights but separate primary contractual obligations, similar to guarantees, which have broader aims than damages. 236 But, under common law, such penalty clauses are not enforceable. 237 However, indemnity clauses are primary obligations too. Their aims are different from those of damages clauses. The only difference from guarantees is that guarantees merely establish an ancillary obligation. Thus, it seems less arguable that indemnity clauses can be "infected" as well.
The Future of the Framework: News from Heidelberg?
Different ideas have been proposed as to how to prevent the risk of irreconcilable decisions following from parallel proceedings in courts and tribunals by amending the Regulation.
238 233 See also, regarding this connection, Briggs and Rees, supra n 75, 451. 234 Byford and Sarwar, supra n 136, 30. 235 Mankowksi, supra n 61, 33. He states very briefl y that the agreements are "infected" by the fact that a right not to be sued is denied by the ECJ, as the aims of both obligations are the same. He says that the problem is not the means used to secure but the object that is secured. The Report was published to deal, inter alia, with the practical problems arising in interfaces between the Regulation and international arbitration.
239 After considering the above-mentioned proposals, the Report confi rms the prevalence of the Convention and concludes that it is not appropriate to make far-reaching amendments to the Regulation. 240 It seems to suggest an exception from the obligation to stay for the designated court. 241 This would be in line with the rule under Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention.
242
In detail, it is proposed to delete Article 1(2)(d) JR, 243 to insert a provision on supportive proceedings into Article 22(6) JR, 244 and to add a new Article 27A JR 245 as well as a new recital 246 concerning the place of arbitration. The Report does not follow proposals to insert a true arbitration exception or a new ground for non-recognition. 247 The importance of the principle of free movement of judicial decisions in the European Union and the wide acceptance of the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in disregard of arbitration agreements are stressed. once the defendant contests the jurisdiction of the court with respect to existence and scope of an arbitration agreement if a court of the Member State that is designated as place of arbitration in the arbitration agreement is seised for declaratory relief in respect to the existence, the validity and/or scope of that arbitration agreement." 246 Ibid, para 136. The proposed text reads: "The place of arbitration shall depend on the agreement of the parties or be determined by the arbitral tribunal. Otherwise, the court of the Capital of the designated Member State shall be competent, lacking such a designation the court shall be competent that would have general jurisdiction over the dispute under the Regulation if there was no arbitration agreement." 247 See ibid, para 126, where the "several fl aws" of this proposal are discussed. 248 Ibid, paras 128, 129: "Acceptance in case law and legal doctrine". See especially para 129:
"However, the more principal question is whether an arbitral award can be assimilated to a
In fact, the Report proposes reducing grounds for non-recognition, as judicial review is not in line with the general principle of trust.
249
Deleting the exception would bring declaratory judgments and ancillary court proceedings under the scope of the Regulation.
The relationship between the Regulation and the Convention would be governed by Article 71 JR, thus reducing the danger of confl icting decisions and enforcing the position of the party relying on an agreement in cases where a court confi rms its existence. 250 In order to discourage frustrating litigation, it is proposed to require court proceedings to be stayed once declaratory relief is sought in the country of the place of the arbitration in due time, as well as standard forms for arbitration agreements. 251 However, arbitration proceedings would still not be classifi ed as court proceedings, nor arbitral awards as judgments. 252 The Regulation would cover only court proceedings concerning arbitration. Thus, arbitral anti-suit injunctions would remain possible.
The Report's suggestions were included in the European Commission's Green Paper. 253 It basically proposes every possible solution together with its drawbacks. 254 However, it follows the Report in considering a deletion of the judgment of a civil court. This question relates to the basic concept of the free movement of judgments in the European Judicial Area which is built on the mutual trust in the court systems of the Member States. The assimilation of arbitral awards to judicial decisions would entail that the same mutual trust existed in relation to arbitration. While there is no doubt that the European Community and all Member States recognise the utility and the judicial quality of arbitration . . . there is equally no doubt that . . . a residual judicial control of the procedural fairness of the award (as contemplated by Article V of the New York Convention) is still necessary." 249 See Heidelberg Report, supra n 51, para 560. 250 Ibid, para 122. 251 The Heidelberg Report states that "the proposition, however, presupposes that a device could be developed for the purpose of discouraging obstructing or frustrating litigation" (para 123 254 Ibid. It is proposed, on p 5: (1) to release the second-seised court from its obligation to stay, (2) to reverse the priority rule insofar as exclusive choice of court agreements are concerned, (3) to establish a direct communication and cooperation between the two courts, combined with a deadline for the court fi rst seised to decide on the question of jurisdiction; (4) to grant damages; (5) to exclude the application of the lis pendens rule in situations where the parallel proceedings are proceedings on the merits on the one hand and proceedings for (negative) declaratory relief on the other hand. The drawbacks are: (1) the risk of irreconcilable judgments; (2) the fact that if the agreement is invalid, a party must seek fi rst to establish the invalidity before the arbitration exclusion as benefi cial. 255 It is proposed to grant an exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the seat of arbitration for proceedings in support of arbitration, to allow the recognition of judgments on the validity of an arbitration agreement and to give priority to the courts of the Member State where the arbitration takes place to decide on the existence of an arbitration agreement, possibly combined with time limits for the party which contests its validity. 256 A uniform confl ict rule concerning the validity of the agreement is considered to reduce the risk of varying decisions between Member States.
257
Contrary to the Report, it is noted that the Convention might benefi t from an additional ground for non-recognition due to a confl icting award. 
Reactions to the Proposed Changes 259
Considering the complex nature of the issue, the multiplicity of reactions to the proposed changes is not surprising. The scope of this article does not allow them all to be explored in depth, though a few comments seem mandatory.
(a) Reactions
Prima facie it seems, especially considering the reactions from arbitration institutions and international law fi rms, that the propositions in the Green Paper are viewed as being too far-reaching and detrimental to international commercial arbitration.
Recurring criticisms are: (i) the limited number of actual problems caused by the arbitration exception does not justify the fundamental structural change court designated in the agreement before being able to seise the otherwise competent courts; (3) the fact that a claimant may lose a legitimate forum for reasons outside his/her control. 255 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, 9. 256 Ibid: the exclusive juris diction could possibly be subject to an agreement between the parties. If this approach is followed, uniform criteria should permit to determine the place of arbitration. The Green Paper follows the Heidelberg Report, supra n 51, para 125, where it is proposed that the Regulation should be supplemented by some kind of guideline for a determination of the seat of arbitration before adding a new head of exclusive jurisdiction for ancillary proceedings, as sometimes the place of arbitration is not determined in the arbitration agreement and there is no uniform defi nition of the seat in the Member States. The goal is to give arbitration agreements the fullest possible effect. 257 Moreover, the biggest issue remains that an obligation to recognise and enforce judgments dealing with the existence of arbitration agreements which are rendered under the Regulation would prevent an assessment of the existence of the agreement where a judgment on the merits or a judgment anulling an award has to be recognised. This, in turn, might lead to confl icts for the 260 It is also proposed that Art 27A JR "should be amended so as to make clear that the stay is to be issued even where the parallel court proceedings are aimed at obtaining a decision on the prima facie existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement, or where the decision on the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement is to be made in the fi rst instance by the arbitral tribunal itself. Such a formulation differs from the Heidelberg Report's proposal in that it covers all court and arbitral tribunals' decisions permitting the arbitration to proceed." See Reaction of the International Bar Association -Arbitration Committee. Also, if priority were given to the courts of the seat of the arbitration to decide the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, the relevant provision should apply also where the decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement is to be made in the fi rst instance by the arbitral tribunal itself, see ibid.
recognising courts with the -paramount 267 -obligation under the Convention to refer disputes to arbitration where the arbitration agreement is deemed valid. The fear is that automatic recognition would result in jurisdictions less favourable to arbitration dictating the lowest common denominator utilised in Europe in determining whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable or not.
268
It is not surprising that the proposition to include further grounds for refusal of recognition of judgments resulting from proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreements is widely approved.
(b) A Different Point of View
Although all the above-mentioned reactions stress valuable and critical points, this article would like to assume a differing viewpoint: it should be recalled that the overall goal is to reach a mechanism to enforce party autonomy and discourage tactical litigation which also, and maybe foremost, allows the free movement of decisions, legal certainty and judicial protection throughout the internal market. The importance of the last aspect, which was one of the basic reasons for the West Tankers decision, is also mirrored in the reactions. 270 Thus, in the context of balancing party autonomy with other concerns, it seems just that where parties want to see their autonomous choices enforced they can be expected to do their bit when negotiating and drafting their contracts -even to the extent of what in Germany is known as the concept of Obliegenheit. 271 The key to the new system proposed by the Green Paper is the responsible choice of the parties: how can "arbitration-unfriendly" courts infl u- 267 See Heidelberg Report, supra n 51, para 116, where it recognises the "prevalence of the New York Convention". See Green Paper, supra n 253: "The 1958 New York Convention is generally perceived to operate satisfactorily and is appreciated among practitioners. It would therefore seem appropriate to leave the operation of the Convention untouched or at least as a basic starting point for further action." 268 . . or the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration; (6) if it is reconcilable with an arbitral award binding on the same parties, provided that the award meets the conditions for recognition in the Member State in which recognition of the judgment is sought." 270 See Reaction of Professors Magnus and Mankowski, who remind that "the mere defence that parties have allegedly agreed upon arbitrating should not amount to depriving a court properly seised of its jurisdiction over the main subject matter." 271 Obliegenheiten are requirements to act in a certain way which are more in the party's own interest than an obligation in the strict sense of the word. They cannot be enforced but non-compliance results in the preclusion of certain rights. Usually, they exist within contractual obligations, but there are also procedural Obliegenheiten, eg under § 138 Zivilprozessordnung. See also AG Léger's opinion in Gasser at para 82, where he reminds fi rms "of their own responsibilities . . . to conclude jurisdiction agreements which, precisely, leave no doubt as to their validity and scope".
ence the enforcement of the arbitration process where parties unambigously choose their arbitration seat in an "arbitration-friendly" Member State, where courts are known generally to refer disputes to arbitration? What has been alleged in reaction to West Tankers regarding parties who prefer to choose arbitration seats where anti-suit injunctions are available must be true in this context too. Only the remedy has changed from injunctive to declaratory relief. It is true that a party facing a possible torpedo cannot simply continue with arbitration -it must obtain a "protective judgment". However, under the proposed regime the "friendly" courts, chosen indirectly through the seat of arbitration, will avail themselves of an exclusive jurisdictional head as well as priority to decide on the existence of the agreement, and their judgments will have to be recognised in the "unfriendly" Member States. 272 Thus, the more likely result seems to be a rise in the level to which arbitration will be enforced in Europe. A clear choice of the seat of arbitration would furthermore reduce the problems connected with its uniform determination.
273
This new priority-based relief system, which is indeed supported by the House of Lords in its reaction, 274 is an invitation to the parties and their legal advisers. But, in the end, it is only the parties' clear choice that will allow the new system to work.
Most importantly, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the arbitral tribunal remains untouched. The chosen tribunals can decide in parallel to the declaratory proceedings, inter alia on their jurisdiction. This is the only systematically and (teleo-) logically sound interpretation of the "partial deletion" the Green Paper proposes -which aims "to strengthen the effectiveness of arbitration agreements at Community level in so far as such arbitral agreements come to be considered before the courts". 275 This interpretation merely restates what already is European caselaw. 276 It is also in line with the paramount position of the Convention, which was restated in the Report and in the travaux préparatoires. Thus, courts do not decide on jurisdiction instead of tribunals; they decide instead of other courts that have been seised in breach of an arbitration agreement. It is important to stress that "providing for declaratory relief does not force the party adhering to the arbitration agreement into state court litigation any more than a torpedo action would do". 277 It is indeed perceived that "torpedoing" might have become more attractive after West Tankers. 278 The result is that the existence of the arbitration agreement may be judged in parallel by two bodies, with possible implications at the enforcement stage. However, under the new system the monopolisation in terms of exclusivity and priority of the declaratory decision on the existence of the arbitration agreement together with the obligation to recognise this decision minimises the risk that the jurisdiction may be judged differently than by the tribunal. This, in turn, minimises enforcement risks for the award. Thus, where a torpedo action is imminent, the proposed defensive mechanism can be used effectively. However, its deterrent effect may already be suffi cient and there may be no need to seise a national court. Therefore, it is not true that the Commission is trying to replace the system of recognising awards by a system of recognising judgments. 279 It tries to establish an optional system to enforce private choices which has two distinctive features: (i) a priority-based protective relief available in cases of torpedoing; (ii) minimising confl icting decisions -and thereby enforcing arbitration -through allowing parallel proceedings before national courts in a monopolised way. In terms of enforcement, the formal criterion as to which kind of body rendered the decision is operable and certain. 280 In order to make the defensive mechanism work, it is necessary to open up the arbitration exclusion, thereby guaranteeing that the prioritised decision will have to be recognised in the other, eventually "unfriendly", Member States. seat of arbitration is. However, there are diffi culties in applying Article 71 JR and "it seems well advisable to look closely at the scope of Art 71 JR and to reduce it as far as possible". 287 Thus, the risk of clashes in this context should not be overstated.
E. CONCLUSION
The ECJ's decision in West Tankers still makes sense. The protection of the judicial right to access national courts makes it necessary that even proceedings outside the scope of the Regulation may not impede other proceedings that are within the scope and that the arbitration exception is interpreted narrowly. It is not always just the defendant who needs protection.
288
Although so far it has only replaced one risk of confl icting decisions with another one, there is a good chance that the current risk constitutes simply an interphase. 289 Eliminating the anti-suit injunction in Europe has been the fi rst step to a certain and coherent system of free movement of judgments. The next step is the partial elimination of the arbitration exception. Both the Report and the Green Paper show the efforts taken to achieve the goal of reducing the risk of confl icting decisions. Declarative proceedings will have an exclusive jurisdictional head in the state of the seat of arbitration, and the judgments on the existence of the agreement will be within the scope of the Regulation and thus will have to be recognised. Once this has happened, tactical litigation will be senseless. 290 The (relative) Kompetenz-Kompetenz of tribunals will remain untouched as well as the paramount position of the Convention. The positive effect of arbitration will be maximised through a system of parallel litigation which gives effect to party autonomy and the free movement of decisions -provided that parties choose responsibly.
The bitter taste of the possible loss of confi dentiality remains. However, it would be equally lost where a party applies for an anti-suit injunction to a national court.
In the meantime, the anti-suit injunction as a protective means for party autonomy can be substituted through equipollent remedies. The issue as to if, and to what extent, damages are permissible under the Regulation needs to be 287 See Heidelberg Report, supra n 51, para 145. 288 See A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Cchoice ofLlaw (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008), 531, where he reminds that any approach which makes the assumption that there is a valid jurisdiction agreement is controversial, as "freedom to make an agreement is also freedom not to make an agreement". 289 In this interphase, good legal advice on how to draft contracts, how to proceed tactically and how to amend old clauses becomes prominently important. 290 Supported by the notifi cation provisions inserted by the parties to assure that they can be fi rst in the race: see Section D.3(b) supra.
clarifi ed. This is the chance to show sensibility regarding the sanctity of bargains and commercial needs. Contractual provisions cannot prevent parties from bringing court actions, 291 but they may have deterrent value and provide additional clear evidence. They hasten proceedings and thereby may reduce the risk of a party becoming insolvent after exhausting his resources during court proceedings. One year after the decision, there are still no signs of danger for London as an arbitration centre. Dealing with legal traditions always requires sensibility. In the same way that the Common Law has lost the anti-suit injunction in Europe, French law cannot uphold its "Fincantieri"-rule. 292 Thus, to consider and respect national procedural systems, which work perfectly when observed in isolation from the Regulation, is of utmost importance. This needs to be contemplated during the decision how far changes to the Regulation need to go, as well as to what extent national procedures will have to (or even can) be changed in order to implement the new rules. However, "the Regulation is one of the most successful pieces of EC legislation". 293 It should be cultivated and its fundamental principles should be promoted. Sometimes it is necessary to give up national traditions in the compromise for a greater good. 294 The advantages of the free internal market are well worth it. 291 Indeed, where a foreign court decides that the arbitration agreement does not exist, all included supporting provisions will be void: see Byford and Sarwar, supra n 136, 31 292 CA Paris, Rev arb [2001] 87; see also for a discussion of the French perspective on the matter, F Niggemann, "West Tankers, die 'exception francaise" und die Reform der EuGVO" ["West Tankers, the 'exception francaise' and the Reform of Regulation 44/2001"] [2010] Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren (German Arbitration Journal) 67. 293 See Heidelberg Report, supra n 51, para 1. 294 See Heinze and Dutta, supra n 10, 437, where they recall that in another context it has been the German position which has been "dismantled".
